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THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT: DOES IT
PROTECT THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS?
Parens patriae is a generic term describing the State's
broad exercise of equitable powers in aid of individuals who lack

the capacity to effectively enforce their rights or to seek redress
for their grievances.' In a broad sense, the doctrine reflects
1. When the statute codifying the equitable doctrine of parens patriae had been on the books slightly over a decade, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted proudly that the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was generally
recognized as the first in this country. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328,
333, 100 N.E. 892, 894 (1913). Today, after some 75 years of practice
under the statute in all its variations, criticism replaces commendation
and modesty replaces pride. Justice Fortas described this attitude,
shared by jurists and social scientists alike, when he wrote:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purposes to make tolerable the immunity of the
process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to
adults.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
In Hamerick v. People, the court described the doctrine in jurisdictional terms:
The court of chancery has the jurisdiction, independently of statutory enactment, and may and will, whenever it appears that the parents are grossly unfit to care for their child and fail in that respect,
interfere and deprive them of the custody of their child, and appoint
a suitable person or persons to act as guardian and care for the child.
126 Ill. App. 491, 492 (1906) (citations omitted).
Similarly, the court in In re Brown, 117 Ill. App. 332, 335-36 (1904),
noted that
[t]he provisions of this humane law are not new in principle. The
novelty is in procedure only. The State has always retained the ultimate control of minors. The right or duty of the parent to care for
and to bring up the child is not exclusive or final. In [certain cases],
the State has the right, and it is its duty, to take the child from
the parents in order that it may have a chance to grow up into a
law-abiding citizen.
Many social scientists view the concept of parens patriae in another
light:
The degree of state intervention on the private ordering of the parent-child relationship ranges from a minimum-the automatic assignment of a child by birth certificate to his biological parentsto a maximum-court-ordered removal of a child from his custodians
because he is found to be 'neglected'

to be parents.
GOLDSTEIN,

FREUD,

&

. . .

or they are found 'unfit'

SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS

OF THE

CHILD, at 4 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]. See also Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness
in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973), dealing primarily with
delinquency proceedings but discussing the astonishingly broad discretion of juvenile courts practicing under the philosophy of parens patriae.
Moreover, while practice under the Juvenile Court Act is not intended to be adversary in nature, the juvenile's best interests can only
be served by vigorous efforts of all involved to identify these interests
and to make dispositional plans accordingly. For a fine overview of
juvenile law and practice in Illinois, with special emphasis on the problems faced by counsel for parents, see generally JUVENILE PRACTICE, re-
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society's special concern for those least able to meet its challenges. Under the rubric of "juvenile law," the Illinois legislature has sought to regulate both juvenile delinquency and adult
mistreatment of minors under their care, by invoking the doctrine of parens patriae. In this setting it must be assumed that
juveniles are the object of the State's benevolent protection, although parents or other legal guardians may also be in need of
assistance, especially in cases of neglect or dependence.
Historically, the courts have relied on the parens patriae
concept to give the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act 2 a broad
application. For example, in the leading case of People ex rel.
Houghland v. Leonard,3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
jurisdiction of circuit and county courts under an earlier version
of the Act 4 extended to the affairs of minors who might be under
the protection of guardians appointed by probate courts.5 The
court concluded that the broad objectives of the Act could "be
narrowed to an identity with the appointment of a guardian only
by mistaking method for purpose."6 Justice Schaefer noted:
vised ed. (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 1974), §§ 6-1
et seq. [hereinafter referred to as I.C.L.E.].
The benevolent attitude reflected by the doctrine of parens patriae
is, apparently, not shared by those whom it seeks to protect. The Report
of the Illinois White House Conference, On Children and Youth, May
1970, recommended the creation of county or circuit advisory committees
to the juvenile court for the purpose of reviewing programs and methods
directed toward handling juveniles. The conferences concluded that
major emphasis should be directed to proposing ways in which courts
may shed their characterization by young persons as antagonists and
punishers.
This is not to suggest that the exercise of jurisdiction under the
juvenile act must necessarily lead to harsh or unjust results. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
In In re Flynn, 22 Ill. App. 3d 994, 318 N.E.2d 105 (1974), a petition alleged that the parents of a young girl were unfit to retain the custody
of any of their children by reason of depravity. Fred Flynn, a cab driver,
had a regular customer named Harold Miller who told him of his desire
to meet and marry a young girl, and also of his ability to help Flynn
out financially. Flynn, who was in debt at the time, arranged for Miller
to meet Flynn's 12 year old daughter. Miller gave Flynn approximately
$28,000 and departed with Flynn's daughter for South Carolina, where
they were to be married. The trial court granted the appointment of
a guardian with power to consent to adoption of all the Flynn children,
and on appeal that order was affirmed.
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 et seq. (1973).
3. 415 Ill. 135, 112 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 191 (1951).
5. This case came before the court upon a writ of habeas corpus
which raised broad constitutional questions regarding the validity of section 191 of the Act. Section 20 of Article VI of the constitution vested
exclusive jurisdiction over the "appointment of guardians" in probate
courts in counties in which such courts existed. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §
20 (1870). Section 18 of the same article provided that county courts
should otherwise have original jurisdiction in all probate matters. ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 18 (1870). The petitioner contended that since a probate court had been established in Rock Island County, the local county
court had acted beyond its jurisdiction in issuing a warrant of commitment.
6. 415 Ill. at 139, 112 N.E.2d at 699. The court also pointed out that
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Further differences [between the objectives of the Act and
the powers of the probate courts] could be pointed out. Those
enumerated, however, are, in our opinion, sufficient to refute
the argument advanced by petitioner that the entire future development of the doctrine of parens patriae was intended to be
committed irrevocably and exclusively to county or probate
courts by 7 the constitutional references to 'the appointment of a
guardian.'
In effect, the court declined to infer any limitation on the
breadth and applicability of the Act's provisions absent a clear
constitutional mandate. A unanimous court reasoned that a
circuit or county court might assume jurisdiction concurrently
with another court notwithstanding problems of judicial comity,
provided that differences in purpose existed.8 It seems certain,
therefore, that the doctrine of parens patriae will be freely
employed by the courts to achieve the legislative purposes
embodied in the statute.9

THE STATUTORY LAW
The wording of section 701-210 is calculated to impress a
case-by-case approach upon the juvenile courts. But, like an
unassuming toddler who, having drawn pictures upon the walls,
seeks to remedy his mischief by rubbing it away with dirty
hands, the language tends to create its own hazards.
Even more fundamental problems result from the operation
of specific statutory provisions, especially those which mirror
public policies at variance with contemporary scientific thought
on child development. For example, in creating a residuum of
parental rights and responsibilities, following a transfer of legal
custody or guardianship, section 701-1611 reflects a public policy
the statutory provisions of the Probate Act with respect to guardians established no means for effective supervision of the conduct of guardians,
whereas the Juvenile Court Act closely regulated the conduct of guardians.
7. Id. at 141, 112 N.E.2d at 700.
8. Strictly speaking, juvenile and probate courts do not share concurrent jurisdiction over the affairs of minors. "Concurrent jurisdiction"
has been defined as the jurisdiction of several different tribunals, each
authorized to deal with the same subject-mattter at the choice of the
suitor. See, e.g., Cashman v. Vickers, 69 Mont. 516, 223 P. 897, 899
(1924). Because the Act was specifically designed to extend the protection of the state to minors, only the state may prosecute in the juvenile
courts. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-1(1) (1973).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1973). This section applies to all
cases falling under the provisions of the Act. See, e.g., In re Garmon,
4 Ill. App. 3d 391, 280 N.E.2d 19 (1972) (dependency and neglect); People
v. Hackman, 1 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 275 N.E.2d 488 (1971) (delinquency).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1973). See note 11 infra.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-16 (1973).
See also § 701-2 which
provides in pertinent part:
(1) The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor subject
hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will
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that favors parents as the persons best suited to care for their
child. Yet, researchers have pointed out that:
Biological parents are credited with an invariable, instinctively based positive tie to the child, although this is frequently
infantbelied by evidence to the contrary, in cases of infanticide,
12
battering, child neglect, abuse, and abandonment.
Put another way, the available evidence strongly suggests that
in many cases parental interests will be in conflict with the best
interests of the child.
THE "BEST INTERESTS" DOCTRINE

The main effect of the public policy implemented by section
701-1613 is to inject a scientifically unsound element into juvenile
proceedings which is capable of distracting the court from its
primary duty to determine the best interests of the child. To
the extent that a judge is unlikely to possess personal expertise
either in such related matters as child psychology, counselling,
and child placement, or in regard to the diagnosis and treatment
of the parent's problems, the potential for anomalous dispositions
in neglect and dependent cases is heightened. 14 Moreover, it
seems apparent that decisions which might irrevocably affect the
family unit must be made on the basis of a subjective balancing
process without regard to available laboratory diagnostic techniques of analyzing delicate interpersonal relationships. In fact,
even where resources through outside agencies are available, the
offered services may be of limited utility to the court insofar
as individual personalities or organizational pressures within
these agencies distort their objectivity. 15 Therefore, although
serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the community....
Id. § 701-2 (1973) (emphasis added).
12.

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS

at 17.

13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-16 (1973).

14. It has been suggested that, for lawyers, this dilemma is compounded by the fact that strict adherence to trial concepts of advocacy

might result in exposing the child to further and more serious injury.
Moreover, since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), in which legal representation of minors
in juvenile delinquency cases was elevated to a constitutional right, the

probability that such problems will become more common place has increased. See also KEMPE AND HELFER, HELPING THE BATIERED CHILD AND
His FAMILY, 225-41 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as KEMPE AND
HELFER].

Child placement"... involves, implicitly if not explicitly, a predication about who, among available alternatives, holds most promise for
meeting the child's psychological need." BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS at

6.

For a discussion of possible therapeutic approaches to the parents
of battered children, see KEMPE AND HELFER, 3-22. Such persons share
"...

a common pattern .

.

. of child rearing characterized by a high de-

mand for the child to perform so as to gratify the parents, and by the
use of severe physical punishment to ensure the child's proper behavior."
Id. at 4.

15. Id. at 127-45. The institution of social work is frequently charged
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a court pursuant to the Act' 6 is bound to resolve any conflict
between the rights of the parents and the interests of the minor
in favor of the child, the introduction of such extraneous factors
as the rights of the parents invites an undesirable subjective
analysis of the minor's best interests in light of such rights.
THE "BEST INTERESTS" STANDARD

The so-called "best interests of the child" standard is always
the goal against which judicial responses will be measured. 17
The doctrine may be compared to the parens patriae concept insofar as the phrase "best interests of the child" clearly implies that
a wide and flexible range of approaches be made available to
the court in disposing of neglect and dependent cases. However,
it has been pointed out that
[i]n giving meaning to this goal, decision makers in law have
recognized the necessity of protecting a child's physical wellbeing as a guide to placement. But they have been slow to
understand and to acknowledge the necessity of safeguarding a
child's psychological well-being. 18
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the "best interests" standard is mitigated by a statutory presumption that the natural
parents are best fit to care for and to have custody of the

child, 19 notwithstanding the psychological fact that the child's
with being resistant to change due to a combination of conservative
forces. Practice in many of our social service programs has become institutionalized. The agencies often serve well those who are motivated
to individually seek help; but what of the others? It has been noted
that "[s]ocial work administrators rationalize failure to move toward

change by projecting blame on external problems-lack of budget, insufficient staff, inadequate space, heavy caseloads, and so on." Id. at 129.
Moreover,

[t]he specifics of child protective services demand special skills
in staff and an approach which seeks out the neglecting family to
extend services on behalf of children despite initial rejection or resistance by sometimes hostile or disturbed parents.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
Ideally, a program must recruit mature and experienced personnel
who have the highest social work skills and must tailor caseloads down
to permit the application of these optimum skills.
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(3) (1973). This subsection is new

to the Act and became effective on October 1, 1973. Its effect is to incorporate the "best interests" standard into the statute. Formerly, this
factor would be applied implicitly by a court acting pursuant to the
Juvenile Court Act.
17. It has been pointed out by Judge John P. McGury that "best interests" will ultimately be the criterion for final disposition in any proceeding connected with child custody.
(a) Neglect-Best interest of child
(b) Guardianship-Best interest of child
(c) Habeas Corpus-Best interest of child
(d) Custody-Best interest of child
(e) Unfitness-Best interest of child
ILL. Juv. PRAC., revised ed. (Ill. Inst. for C.L.E., 1974) at 8-11.

18.

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS

at 4.

19. See note 36 infra. Section 701-2 directs that the child's welfare
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attachment to these adults results from their "day-to-day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation, '

20

and may be unrelated to biological ties.

Moreover, it is not certain whether the standard recognizes that
as the "prototype of true human relationship, the psychological
child-parent relationship is not wholly positive but has its admixture of negative elements,'

21

or even that to some degree

environmental factors shape the child's development.
It appears, therefore, that the "best interests" doctrine
possibly suffers from a fatal weakness, namely, that it is not
designed to bridge complex psychological gaps in child-parent
relationships. Consequently, the flexible "best interests" standard must be applied by the courts at the expense of consistency
of result, at least from a socio-psychological standpoint.
Parental Fitness vis-a-vis the "Best Interests" Doctrine
It is in connection with the problem of unfitness as a basis
for termination of parental responsibilities that the shortcomings
of the "best interests" doctrine become most apparent. Although
at least one commentator has properly pointed out that unfitness
may not be a prerequisite to the termination of parental responsibilities in all proceedings involving child custody, since in most
instances the test ultimately is one of "best interests, ' 22 it is

evident that in the juvenile court context the two concepts are
not mutually exclusive, but rather that the "best interests"
standard was intended to encompass the fitness test.
The question of whether parental fitness will be determinative of the right to custody is one which has perplexed the courts
for decades.23 The older cases held that the rights of parents
could be cut off for "good and sufficient" cause,2 4 but it cannot
be established "preferably in his own home." ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 37, §
701-2 (1973).
20.

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS at 17.

21. Id. at 19.

22. See generally Veverka, The Right of Natural Parents To Their
Children As Against Strangers: Is The Right Absolute?, 61 ILL. B.J. 234

(1973). The author distinguishes habeas corpus proceedings, in which
unfitness may not be a prerequisite, and adoption proceedings, in which
unfitness is required by statute. With regard to neglect and dependence
cases under the Act, there is a problem insofar as the legislature seems
to have adopted both tests in the present Act. See discussion at text
8-11 infra.

23. See, e.g., People v. Shine, 271 Ill. App. 479, 483 (1933).
24. In People v. Weeks, 228 Ill. App. 262 (1923), a petition for habeas
corpus was denied even though the relator was not found either to be
negligent or unfit with regard to his daughter. However, in People v.
Shine, 271 Ill. App. 479 (1933), a neglect petition was held not to have
alleged "good and sufficient" cause for termination of William Shine's
responsibility as a parent where the evidence did not disclose unfitness.

Similarly, in In re Harstad, 337 Ill. App. 74, 84 N.E.2d 855 (1949), the

court described its decision to terminate the parental rights of Leroy Har-

402 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 9:396

be gleaned from them whether or not unfitness was a condition
precedent to a permanent termination of parental rights. 25
In 1959, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to deal with
this question in the case of Giaeopelli v. The Crittenton Home.26
The case was before the court upon a petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed by Nick and Helen Giacopelli for the purpose of
securing custody of their son from Anthony and Doris Legaz.
Mrs. Giacopelli, apparently without the knowledge of her husband, entered a home for unwed mothers during the fourth
month of pregnancy and subsequently signed a consent form
authorizing adoption of the child.27 This instrument was filed
in the juvenile division of the circuit court of Peoria County and
a dependency decree was entered, after which the child was
placed in the home of respondents.
The court noted that upon a hearing for a writ of habeas
corpus, a trial court may always inquire into parental fitness in
order to resolve the question of the best interests of the child,
and held that the parents need not be totally unfit before a court
may terminate their rights regarding the child. Fitness was
determined to be only one of the factors in determining the best
interests of the child. 28 The majority view appears to resolve
the question of fitness into the larger question of "best interests."
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Klingbiel took issue
on that point: "Contrary to the pronouncement in the majority
opinion, I think it is necessary that parents be found unfit before
their child may be taken from them against their will.

'29

Jus-

tice Klingbiel considered as insufficient the basis of the majority's decision that in light of all the circumstances the child's
interests were best served by placing him in the custody of
strangers, and stated that he would not have concurred in the
result but for the court's finding that the parents were in fact
unfit to retain custody of the child. The combined effect of the
majority and concurring opinions was to increase judicial confustad in favor of the children's stepmother in terms of their best interests,
but specifically found, on the basis of the children's testimony, the defendant unfit as well.

25. Thus, later cases found little precedent value in the earlier decisions upon which to formulate an answer to this question. This fact
should be kept in mind in connection with the Illinois Supreme Court
decision of Giacopelli v. The Crittenton Home, 16 Ill. 2d 556, 158 N.E.2d

613 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 26-41 infra.
26. 16 Ill. 2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (1959).

27. The court found that even though Helen Giacopelli had joined
in the petition with her husband, she had forfeited her individual legal
right to custody of the child.
28. See also People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 42 Ill. 2d 201, 247
N.E.2d 417 (1969)

(habeas corpus); cf. Breger v. Seymour, 74 Ill. App.

2d 197, 219 N.E.2d 265 (1966), decided under § 2009 of the Family Court
Act, ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 23, § 2009, [1951] Ill. Laws (repealed 1965).

29. 16 Ill. 2d at 567, 158 N.E.2d at 619.
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sion surrounding the need for unfitness as a condition to termination of all parental responsibilities.
In spite of the judicial quandry, the Illinois legislature
appears to have opted for the views of the concurring opinion
in Giacopelli by their enactment of section 705-9 ° of the Juvenile
Court Act, permitting a ward of the court to be the subject of
a petition for adoption pursuant to the provisions of the Adoption Act. 1 Under the Adoption Act, the court may empower a
guardian to consent to an adoption whenever the parents consent
to it or are determined to be unfit.8 2 However, because section
705-9 directs a court's attention both to the child's "best interests"
and to his parent's fitness, it is not altogether clear that, having
made a finding on the question of fitness, the court must additionally determine that it is in the child's "best interests" to
permit the adoption to proceed.
If an independent determination based upon the "best
interests" test must be made, this section of the Act is indeed
consistent with the majority opinion in Giacopelli insofar as it
requires a court to consider all the circumstances of a case before
empowering a guardian to consent to adoption. At the same
time, it is doubtful whether a court, having already determined
the parents unfit to care for the ward, could find that it is not
in the "best interests" of the child to permit adoption proceedings
to be instituted. A finding of unfitness in connection with termination proceedings is, in a sense, the ultimate fact in issue concerning the parents, and a fortiori suggests that it is not in the
"best interests" of the child to permit the particular relationship
to continue further.
Notwithstanding this apparent ambiguity, the question seems
resolved to the extent that the incorporation by reference of both
the consent and unfitness requirements of the Adoption Act into
the Juvenile Court Act implicitly suggests that in the absence
of a voluntary consent to adoption nothing less than unfitness
will suffice. In this connection a statement of the Illinois
Appellate Court is instructive:
A condition precedent to an adoption is either consent of the
parent or a finding by the court that consent is not required for
the reason of unfitness ....
To prove unfitness . . . there
must be clear and convincing proof supported by evidence of
conduct in accordance with the definitions .... 3
The case of Oeth v. Erwin3 4 illustrates the apparent strength

30. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 37, § 705-9 (1973).

31. Id. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1 et seq. (1973).
32. Id. at § 9.1-8.
33. In re Smith, 4 Ill. App. 3d 261, 265, 280 N.E.2d 770, 773 (1972).
See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (1971), and note 39 infra.
34. 6 Ill. App. 2d 18, 126 N.E.2d 526 (1955). This case is also fre-

404

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 9:396

of the foregoing statement. There, an appellate court affirmed
a circuit court order granting the respondent's motion to dismiss
a county court's authorization of a consent to adoption on the
ground that the judge had failed either to make a finding of
unfitness or to obtain the parent's consent, and that his order
was consequently void for want of jurisdiction. The appellate
court relied on the rule that when a court is exercising a special
statutory jurisdiction, there can be no presumption of its
authority to act, noting that
[i]n adoption it is not the duty of the court to determine if
petitioners could best provide for the child. The court must
first determine if statutory grounds for adoption exist. .... 35
Thus, it would seem that unless the record shows on its face
that a finding of parental consent or unfitness has been made
in compliance with the Adoption Act, courts will be unwilling
to terminate child-parent relationships.
In this light, cases such as Smith and Oeth stand like signposts to illuminate the path away from the confusion of
6
Yet, although a consistent pattern of strict compliGiacopelli.3
quently cited for its holding that juvenile court decisions are not res judicata.
35. Id. at 22, 126 N.E.2d at 528 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
(§ 209 of the Family Court Act),
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 209 (1953)
was substantially similar to section 705-9 of the present Act. Even had
the county court determined Mr. Erwin to be unfit, it is not suggested
that its finding would have been conclusive. The standard of clear and
convincing proof is a more rigid evidentiary test than that employed at
the adjudicatory stage. See, e.g., In re Overton, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1014,
316 N.E.2d 201 (1974) (findings of the circuit court of Winnebago County
that Colene Overton, the mother, was unfit because "she has failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to
the children [and] she deserted the children"; reversed for lack of evidence); In re Gibson, 24 Ill. App. 3d 981, 322 N.E.2d 223 (1975) (failure
to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, etc.).
36. The recent decision in In re Shuman, 22 Ill. App. 3d 151, 319
N.E.2d 287 (1974), would seem to indicate that a finding of unfitness
is essential to a permanent termination of parental responsibilities. The
case came before the court on an adoption petition pursuant to the terms
of the Adoption Act, ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1971). Taking note
of the case law to the effect that custody can be denied a natural parent
in the absence of unfitness, Justice Stouder explained:
It is essential in a case as the one at bar to distinguish between a
custody proceeding [i.e., habeas corpus] and an adoption case ....
The distinction between the two types of actions is essential because
adoption severs conclusively the rights and interests of natural parents.
22 Ill. App. 3d at 153, 319 N.E.2d at 289. Similarly, the court in In re
Bartha, 107 Ill. App. 2d 214, 245 N.E.2d 779 (1969), rejected petitioner's
contention that parental fitness was not a necessary and dominant criterion for depriving a mother of custody, if the order of dependency is
in the best interests of the child. Noting that Giacopelli was a habeas
corpus case, that its finding of dependency was the result of Helen Giacopelli's voluntary consent to adoption, and that unlike the case before
it the petitioners in Giacopelli were clearly unfit to care for and have
custody of their son, the court concluded:
[W]e cannot deny the natural mother her right to have custody of
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ance with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act has emerged
from the cases, hindsight leads one to question whether the legislature truly acted in the child's "best interests" by introducing
the element of parental fitness as the main issue to be resolved
in adoption proceedings. Clearly, in such proceedings the interests of the parents are a legitimate concern of the courts; the
exercise of a power to consent to adoption by a guardian terminates parental rights, relieves the parents of all responsibility
for the child, and frees the minor from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects his natural parents.3" But
what becomes of the "best interests" doctrine when a court is
precluded from acting because the parents have refused to consent and have not been found unfit? In such cases, does it automatically follow that it is in the "best interests" of the child
not to authorize a consent to adoption?3 8
At present, the ambiguous role of the "best interests" standard in neglect and dependent cases, its uncertain application by
her child, on a record which does not support the trial court's finding
of parental unfitness and dependency.
107 Ill. App. 2d at 221, 245 N.E.2d at 783.
On the other hand, Judge McGury has noted that "once a finding
of neglect has been entered, subsequent rehabilitation of the parents does
not resurrect (in the absence of a vacation of the original finding) the
superior rights of a natural parent." ILL. JUV. PRAc., revised ed. (Ill.
Inst. for C.L.E., 1974) at 6-9. In People v. Hoerner, 6 Ill. App. 3d 994,
287 N.E.2d 510 (1972), the court found that at the time of the trial court's
order adjudicating the Hoerner's children dependent the atmosphere in
which the children lived "was punctuated with drunkenness, deprivation,
filth and consummate hunger." 6 Ill. App. 3d at 996, 287 N.E.2d at 511.
Noting that during the two subsequent years the children had enjoyed
stable family situations with their foster parents, the court refused custody to the petitioners, notwithstanding proof of their rehabilitation.
37. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9(2) (1973).
Compare section
701-12 which provides in part:

'Legal custody' means the relationship created by an order of the

court which imposes on the custodian the responsibility of physical
possession of a minor and the duty to protect, train and discipline
... to provide ... food, shelter, education and ordinary medical
care, except as . . . limited by residual parental rights . . . and the
rights ... of the guardian of the person, if any.
Id. § 701-12.
"Guardianship" is defined in section 701-11:
'Guardianship of the person' of a minor means the duty and authority, subject to residual parental rights and responsibilities, to
make important decisions in matters having a permanent effect on
the life and development of the minor and to be concerned with his
general welfare.
Id. § 701-12.
Moreover, it is clear that legal custody may exist concurrently with
guardianship. Thus, under Section 704-7 the court may condition the return of the child to its parent, custodian, or guardian prior to adjudication or disposition. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-7 (1973). In fact, the
parents retain specific residual rights after an adjudication of dependence
or neglect and the appointment of a guardian or custodian. Cf. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, § 701-16 (1973). See, e.g., People v. Miller, 225 Ill. App.
150 (1922) (duty to support children).
38. For example, if the child has been with foster parents for whom
he has developed an attachment during the pendency of a dispositional
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courts which lack the expertise to make in-depth analyses of
troubled child-parent relationships, and the far-reaching consequences of the adoption process, collectively suggest that the
doctrine is ill-equipped to serve either as a basis for resolving
child-parent conflicts or as a means of implementing society's
interest in such affairs under the concept of parens patriae. In
this connection it should be emphasized that although the grounds
of unfitness set forth in the Adoption Act ensure that the parent
will have sufficient notice of the charges to formulate a proper
defense, they tend to further obscure the issue of the child's "best
interests," and certainly affect child-adult relationships more decisively than other available statutory responses.3 9 Moreover,
while the Juvenile Court Act contemplates adoption as a somewhat extraordinary remedy, the fact is that the power to consent
to adoption has been granted to guardians in a significant percentage of neglect and dependent cases in recent years, and it
40
appears as though this practice will increase in the future.
In contrast with the present statutory scheme, the majority
opinion in Giacopelli sought not only to implement the case by
case approach implicit in the parens patriae concept, but at the
same time, in refusing to mechanically award custody of the child
to its biological parents, anticipated the avenues now being
explored by child care experts.4 1 It must be noted that this
opinion has not been overruled, and could become the operative
basis of a revised Act. Such a statute should incorporate sociopsychological methods of analyzing and treating disturbed childparent relationships, and should place less emphasis on parental
order in his case, is it in his "best interests" to replace him with his
natural parents?
39. See text accompanying note 40 and notes 42-44 infra.
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(D) (L) (1973). This provision,
which became effective on October 1, 1973, assigns an arbitrary period
of two years as the time in-which the parents of neglected children must
have demonstrated their ability to correct their past mistakes. How is
it to be determined whether their efforts to do so have been reasonable
or sincere? What are the effects of this waiting period on the child if
after two years with foster parents he is forced to be reunited with his
natural ones?
It is also interesting to note the number of neglect and dependent
cases which are disposed of by court authorization of consents to adoption:
JUVENILE DIVISION-CASES FILED, REINSTATED
AND ADJUDICATED FOR THE YEAR 1974
(Circuit Court of Cook County):
1974
1973
Difference
FINDING OF DEPENDENCY
168
198
-30
FINDING OF NEGLECT
1657
1751
-94
GUARDIANS WITH CONSENT
TO ADOPT
687
559
+ 128
Above statistics were procured from Cook County Juvenile Court, 1100
South Hamilton, Chicago, Illinois 60612.
41. See text accompanying notes 42-52 infra.
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fitness, as suggested by the majority in Giacopelli. For reasons
that will be more fully discussed below, the need for such swift
legislative action is imperative.
Psychological Stability of the Child vis-ii-vis
the "Best Interests" Doctrine
Another aspect of the "best interests" test which militates
against its usefulness as the governing standard in neglect and
dependent cases, is its apparent inability to foster solutions
capable of maintaining or restoring the psychological well-being
of the child. In this connection, one recent critique of the
nation's various juvenile laws has suggested that present statutes
fail because they neither recognize42 nor account for certain
important socio-psychological factors.
One such factor is a child's need for continuity of relationships. In part, it is the shared experiences of a child and his
parents that produce meaningful family relationships. The
family provides the main backdrop for the gradual development
of love, care, and affection between the minor and his parents,
and the extent to which these feelings develop will largely determine the child's psychological growth.
In turn, the child's need for love, care, and affection,
ordinarily corresponds to age-the younger the child, the greater
his need for support and direction. And because the child's
demands are inherently complex, there is a great need for continuity in his family relationships if these demands are to be fully
satisfied.
In light of these considerations it might reasonably be
expected that all child placements, except when specifically
designed for brief temporary care, would be "as permanent as
the placement of a newborn with its biological parents. '43 This,
however, does not occur under the present Juvenile Court Act.
Under its provisions, the appointment of a legal guardian is not
intended to be a permanent dispositional solution of the juvenile's case, even though the guardian assumes the rights and obligations of a parent. Thus, for example, a grant of legal custody
or guardianship continues until the court otherwise directs, or
until the minor reaches the age of twenty-one years. 44 Moreover, while the guardian must necessarily develop an intimate
relationship with his ward because of the innumerable responsibilities for the child's well-being which are thrust upon him, it
is highly unlikely that the special attachment which exists
42.

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS.

43. Id. at 35.

44. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-7(5) (1973).
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between a child and a loving parent can be duplicated. Perhaps
in order to comport with the child's need for continuity of
relationship, the appointment of guardians should be strictly
limited to a brief duration or eliminated from the Act in favor
of a less rigid form of supervision.
In addition to the need for continuity of relationship, a
second important factor not accounted for by present statutes
concerns a child's sense of time. The juvenile laws fail to recognize that "[u]nlike adults, who have learned to anticipate the
future and thus to manage delay, children have a built-in time
sense based on the urgency of their instinctive and emotional
needs." 5 Thus, for example, abandonment cases presently turn
on the issue of the parents' intent to abandon, whereas application of a "child's sense of time" guideline would require a shift
in focus to the individual child's tolerance for uncertainty in his
relationships. 46 Procedural and substantive decisions in neglect
and dependent cases should always be made within the time that
the child-to-be-placed can endure loss and uncertainty. The
present statute, however, invites long-term uncertainty and
requires psychological endurance of minors who are brought
within its provisions.
In contradistinction to those sections that reflect policies,
principles, or substantive rules, the Juvenile Court Act's procedural provisions inject a formalism into the proceedings that undoubtedly adds to their length. As a result, the minor's time perspective is obscured and the Act's potential for benefitting the
child and society is diminished.
These procedural guidelines were intended by the legislature
to ensure that juvenile court proceedings would provide a fair
and open forum in which all interested parties could work
together to resolve questions affecting the minor's "best interests." Ironically, their cumulative effect is to create opportunities for delay which may well limit the effectiveness of any subsequent dispositional scheme. For example, while the requirement of separate petitions for each child properly narrows the
court's inquiry to the individual child's position and direction,
it may create administrative problems placing an added burden
on the court's capacity to attend to all matters with due regard
for the child's time-sense and need for continuity. 47 Combining
45. BEYoND THE BEST INTlESTS at 40.
46. Id. at 7-8.
47. See ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-1(1) (1973). When a petition
is filed, the clerk of the court issues summons directed to the minor and
to each person named as a respondent in the petition. This summons
must contain a statement that the minor or any of the respondents is
entitled to have an attorney present at the hearing on the petition, including court appointed counsel. Again, failure to comply with these
statutory requirements will nullify an order of court stemming there-
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the potential effects of this provision with those of sections relating to the use of supplemental petitions, conditions of custody
and guardianship, and the manner of conducting adjudicatory
mention a few-the need for statuand dispositional hearings-to
48
clear.
is
revision
tory
from. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-3 (1973). But cf., In re Finch,
40 Ill. App. 2d 18, 189 N.E.2d 678 (1963) (respondent who signed printed
consent form held to have waived service of process).
In fact, failure to comply with the statutory requirements for the
filing of petitions may create more than mere administrative headaches;
since proceedings under the Act are purely statutory, a defective petition
destroys the court's subject matter jurisdiction and renders its orders
void. Moreover, because juvenile court proceedings are not res judicata,
so that even a rejected petitioner can subsequently raise the same matters
before the court, a faulty petition can have definite disruptive effects on
the minor's home life.
48. With regard to the use of supplemental petitions section 704-1 (6)
provides that one or more such instruments may be filed at any time
before dismissal of the petition or before final closing and discharge of
the case under section 705-11. The nature of these petitions will vary
widely, but requests for the appointment or termination of guardianships
and custodial relations, or the seeking of an authorization for a consent
to adoption present common examples of the uses to which supplemental
petitions may be put. See, e.g., In re Gibson, 24 Ill. App. 3d 981, 322
N.E.2d 223 (1975); In re Nyce, 131 Ill. App. 2d 481, 268 N.E.2d 233 (1971).
In connection with guardianship or custodial care under section 70511, the Act provides that both proceedings and wardship automatically
terminate upon the minor's attaining the age of 21 years or whenever
the court finds that the best interests of the minor and the public no
longer require wardship of the court. However, under the latter circumstances the court may continue or terminate any custodianship or guardianship respecting the minor. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-11 (1973).
Cf. Witter v. Cook County Commr's., 256 Ill. 616, 100 N.E. 148 (1912).
In this respect, the court's discretion with regard to the guardianship or
custodian permits the State to maintain some control over the minor's
home life. But the potential for disrupting the minor's psychological development is similar to that created by the use of supplemental petitions.
The statement of Ms. Elizabeth Nolan, Asst. Att. Gen. for Iowa, reflects
the degree of interference which is possible under this type of situation:
A person who is [under 18] and married is still entitled to the protection or guardianship of the state, and the fact of marriage does
not ipso facto thrust the person into majority for all purposes.
1 Family Law Reptr. 2070 (Nov. 26, 1974) (emphasis added) (Family
Law Reptr. hereinafter cited as F.L.R.). Accord, Richardson v. Browning, 18 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
As to procedural difficulties at the adjudicatory and dispositional
stages of the proceedings, the basic problems stem from a shift in the
standard of proof as the case moves from an adjudication of the child
status as either a neglected or dependent minor to the creation of a dispositional scheme. See text accompanying notes 72-83 infra.
On the other hand, sections such as 701-21, which provide that the
State's Attorney is to represent the people of the state in proceedings
under the Act, permit juvenile proceedings in an orderly atmosphere that
is conducive to an early resolution of the minor's "best interests."
Although somewhat of an anomaly, In re Morris, 331 Ill. App. 417,
73 N.E.2d 337 (1947), demonstrates the inherent danger of permitting a
special prosecutor to handle what is, essentially, a matter of state interest. Here, the county probation officer brought in her own attorneys to
prosecute a neglect petition and succeeded in turning the hearing into
an adversary proceeding. She was called as a witness and permitted
to testify over objection to specific hearsay matters tending to blacken
Morris's character. Furthermore, the court refused to permit Morris to
have character witnesses of her own. Not surprisingly, the appellate
court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the order granting the probation officer power to consent to adoption.
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The courts further emasculate protection of the minor's "best
interests" by strictly construing and rigidly enforcing the Act.
The appellate court's statement in Oeth v. Erwin is illustrative
of this attitude:
When the court is exercising a special statutory jurisdiction
there is no presumption of jurisdiction, but the record must
show on its face that the case is one where the court has authority to act, and if it does not, the judgment is void and subject
to collateral attack . . .49
Yet, in fairness to the courts it should be mentioned that they
have been thrust into the awkward position of having to resolve
legal questions solely on the basis of the minor's "best interests,"
while remaining duty-bound to observe and enforce statutory
rules of law that may cut against this standard's effectiveness.
Nonetheless, prior case law suggests that speedy yet expeditious disposition of juvenile matters under the "best interests"
standard is not some mere pipedream or misty Xanadu which
evaporates before it can be fully realized, but rather is well
within the sweep of our legislative and judicial machinery. Thus,
in People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,05 the trial court
unhesitatingly entered an order finding that Cheryl Labrenz,
then 8 days old, was a dependent child whose life was endangered
by the refusal of her parents to consent to a necessary blood
transfusion."'
The court appointed a guardian to consent to
49. 6 Ill. App. 2d 18, 21-22, 126 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1955).

50. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).

51. This was established by hospital records and other medical evidence which established a rare blood disease. Two doctors testified that
death was certain to result if the transfusions were not administered. A
third testified that severe permanent physical damage was likely to result. All agreed that the risk of injury from failure to give the transfusion greatly outweighed the dangers inherent in the administration of
the transfusion itself.
Many courts have recognized that emergency medical care provides
a fertile ground for state intervention into family affairs. See, e.g., In
re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970); State v. Perricone,
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). But cf. In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292
A.2d 387 (1972) (life not in immediate danger).
Certain other well-recognized grounds for. invoking the parens patriae doctrine include: (1) Rejection or physical and emotional neglect.
See, e.g., In re Carl, 22 N.Y.S.2d 782, 194 Misc. 985 (1940). It is apparent
that neglect need not be based solely on physical mistreatment but may
well exist where the facts demonstrate a lack of affection or guidance
by the parent for the child. In In re Harstad 337 Ill. App. 74, 84 N.E.2d
855 (1949), there was some evidence that the lather had a drinking problem, but its severity had not been shown in an entirely clear and convincing manner. On the other hand, it was undisputed that he had the
financial means to support his five children, and his interest in their welfare seemed apparent from the fact of his petition seeking their custody.
However, at the trial the older children's testimony indicated a lack of
affection that a parent ordinarily manifests toward his children, as well
as a lack of instruction or parental guidance. The court denied the
father's petition and permitted the children's stepmother to retain their
custody.
(2) Abandonment. In Robinson v. Neubauer, 79 Ill. App. 2d 362,

19761

Illinois Juvenile Court Act

the transfusion, and returned
parents only when her health
court functioning within the
respond quickly and decisively

the child to the custody of her
had greatly improved. Here, a
limits of the Act was able to
in the best interests of the child,

223 N.E.2d 705 (1967), the evidence demonstrated that after the father
had placed his children in the home of the Robinsons following the death
of his wife, he continued to pay them weekly visits and even moved into
the same neighborhood in order to be nearby. Based on these facts the
court could not find that he had abandoned his children. Justice Craven
noted:
The facts in this case do not establish abandonment as that term
has been used in adoption proceedings. Abandonment has been defined as any conduct on the part of the parent which evidences a
settled purpose to forego all claims to the child ....
Desertion...
is something less than abandonment but would necessarily require
the establishment of the existence of an intention by the parent to
terminate, permanently, custody over the child but not to relinquish
all parental duties.
Id. at 365, 223 N.E.2d at 707. Because this case arose under the Adoption
Act, the unfitness standard was applied to his alleged conduct. Since
this is a more demanding standard than that which is applied in neglect
or dependent cases, abandonment undoubtedly would suffice as the basis
for a neglect or dependent petition.
(3) Anticipated neglect. Apparently, in some jurisdictions, a petition that alleges facts demonstrating anticipated neglect will receive the
court's consideration. However, Illinois is not among these jurisdictions.
See, e.g., In re Nyce, 131 Ill. App. 2d 481, 268 N.E.2d 233 (1971).
(4) Depravity. See, e.g., In re Flynn, 22 Ill. App. 3d 994, 318 N.E.2d
105 (1974); Oeth v. Erwin, 6 Ill. App. 2d 18, 126 N.E.2d 526 (1955).
(5) Physical Abuse. See "The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2041-2047 (effective July 1, 1975).
Insufficient grounds for a finding of neglect or dependence include:
(1) Religion. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892
(1913). Cf. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952). Distinguish the situation where religious beliefs are alleged to be
the reason for child neglect from situations wherein they are asserted
as a defense for conduct which constitutes a recognized ground of neglect.
(2) Birth control. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In In re M.K.R., 1 F.L.R. 2080 (Mo. Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1974), the mother
of a 13 year old mentally retarded child filed a petition to have the court
approve "an abdominal hysterectomy." The court noted:
Whatever might be the merits of permanently depriving this child
of the right [to bear children], the juvenile court may not do so
without statutory authority-authority which provides guidelines
and adequate legal safeguards determined by the people's elected
representatives to be necessary after full consideration of the constitutional rights of the individual and the general welfare of the people.

Id.

(3) Political beliefs. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(alleged communist affiliations).
(4) Poverty. See In re Morris, 331 Ill. App. 417, 73 N.E.2d 337
(1947). But where conditions of poverty give rise to parental conduct
amounting to a legally sufficient basis for a finding of neglect or dependence a different result will be reached. See, e.g., In re Flynn, 22 Il.
App. 3d 994, 318 N.E.2d 105 (1974).
(5) Immorality. In In re Wallingford, 129 Ill. App. 2d 227, 262
N.E.2d 607 (1970), the evidence disclosed that an unmarried "roomer"
was living at the family home; that the defendant mother's youngest
child had been born out of wedlock; that one of her six children moved
from the residence because of differences between the child and the
roomer; and that another daughter, age 16, was engaged to a 29 year
old man. Conversely, the testimony at trial revealed that the family's
standard of living was adequate and that there was a lack of evidence

412 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 9:396

with remarkable magnanimity in a delicate setting. While the
extent to which the urgency of the situation shaped the court's
actions is difficult to determine, it is, unfortunately, less difficult
do not reflect the day-to-day
to conclude that cases such as this
2
operations of our juvenile laws.
CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO A REVISED ACT

As outlined by the previous discussion, the quality of

juvenile justice depends not only upon the degree to which a
set of standards is tailored to meet the minor's needs, but also
upon efforts to correlate the length of proceedings with the
minor's tolerance for inconsistency in his relationships with
adults. Yet, somewhat ironically, many of the problems affecting the smooth operation of the statute, including the length of
proceedings thereunder, arise from considerations of procedural
53
due process.
For example, in In re Estate of Hoffman

4

Jack and Rose

Rosen, who had no biological or legal ties to the child in question, challenged a protective order of the Family Court of Cook
County restraining them from interfering with his care or custody.5 5 At the close of evidence during the adjudicatory hearthat the defendant "carried on" with her roomer in the presence of the
children. The court found in favor of the defendant.
(6) Social standing. Because financially troubled parents are more
likely than others to foster neglected or dependent children, social standing as a basis of neglect or dependence is expressly forbidden by the
Act. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-4(2), 702-5(2) (1973).
(7) Unusual living conditions. See In re Pima County, 18 Ariz. App.
219, 501 P.2d 395 (1972). Cf. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913).
52. A third element not accounted for by the present Act is its own
inability to supervise interpersonal relationships and to make long-range
predictions. Accordingly, it has been noted that:
The process through which a new child-parent status emerges is
too complex and subject to too many individual variations for the
law to provide a rigid statutory timetable.
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS at 48.

53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20 (1973).
54. 49 Ill. App. 2d 436, 200 N.E.2d 37 (1964).
55. The protective order provided
[tihat the petitioner, Jack Rosen, and his wife, Rose Rosen, their
agents and attorneys and all persons acting in concert with them,
be and each of them hereby is enjoined and retricted from interfering in any manner with the care and custody of the child . . . or
with her supervision by the respondents or this court.
Id. at 439, 200 N.E.2d at 38. Cf. § 705-5(1) (a) which provides that such
an order may require any person before the court, "[tlo stay away from
the home or the minor. . .

."

§ 705-5(2) contemplates that notice and

opportunity for hearing be afforded to a person subject to a protective
order.
§ 705-4 deals generally with the supervisory powers of the probation
office over the custodian of a minor. And § 705-6 warns that violations
of either § 705-4 or § 705-5 may warrant contempt of court citations. Subsection (2) of 705-6 grants the clerk of the court discretion to issue certificates of notice to persons "affected by" a protective order or an order

1976]

Illinois Juvenile Court Act

ing the court suggested a plan for the child, but the respondents,
who were the adoptive parents, protested, stating their belief
that the Rosens would "look over the shoulder of whoever is
treating the child."5 6 When Jack Rosen, the only appellant to
appear at the hearing, warned that if the future treatment of
the child were not to his liking he would again bring the matter
to court, the trial judge ordered him from the courtroom,
declared the child a dependent in the custody of his parents, and
subsequently directed that the protective order be prepared. The
appellants moved to vacate the order on various grounds. Rose
Rosen argued that she had not been a party to the action since
she was not served with process, never submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, nor was ever present during any of the proceedings. It was also contended that the order was invalid as
it related to Jack Rosen because there was no evidence or hearing within his presence. The motion was denied and an appeal
taken.
Although the trial court's methods had clearly gone beyond
the section of the Act regulating the issuance of protective orders,
the respondents insisted that the protective order had been
entered pursuant to the court's inherent ancillary jurisdiction to
enforce and protect its orders and not pursuant to its authority
under the Juvenile Court Act."
Justice Kluczynski was not
impressed, noting that "[t]his argument begs the question. A
court may have authority but it must be exercised in accordance
with due process of law."58 While conceding that the trial court
of protective supervision. The certificate, in turn, when presented to any
peace officer, authorizes the taking-into-custody of a violator, who must
then appear before the court to explain his conduct.
56. 49 Ill. App. 2d at 438, 200 N.E.2d at 38.
57. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2009.1 (1963), which expressly covered persons before the court pursuant to service of process or voluntary
appearance. Cf. § 705-5.
58. 49 Ill. App. 2d at 441, 200 N.E.2d at 39. But cf. People v. Davis,
11 Ill. App. 3d 775, 298 N.E.2d 350 (1973), where the reviewing court
refused to consider appellant's due process attack upon the order of a
trial court.
In People v. Davis a petition was filed to have Mario Davis declared
a dependent minor for the reason that he was not receiving proper care
due to the mental condition of his mother. At the first of four hearings,
Lillian Davis, the mother, was called by the State pursuant to section
60 of the Civil Practice Act. Over objection she testified. On appeal
from an order declaring Mario a dependent, the mother contended that
compelling her testimony as an adverse witness was contrary to the Act,
a denial of due process, and in violation of her right against self-incrimination. On the issue of whether compelling a parent named as a party
in a dependent petition to testify amounted to a violation of such person's
right against self-incrimination, the appellate court noted that it did not,
holding that the phrase "in any criminal case," as used in the United
States and Illinois Constitutions, is interpreted to include civil actions
only where a person's testimony might tend to convict him of a criminal
offense or subject him to a fine or incarceration. The court further concluded that the mother was not so threatened and that in any case the
privilege can be raised only after the witness has been sworn and asked
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undoubtedly acted with the best interests of the child in mind, he
added that "it had no basis as a matter of principle or law, for
the entry of this order. '5 9 Thus, because Jack and Rose Rosen
were not afforded their fundamental rights to receive notice, and
to appear and be heard in open court, the appellate court could
not close the door on the possibility of an extended custody fight
affecting the best interests of the child.
Today, section 701-20 of the Act sets forth the rights of
parties to juvenile proceedings. These include the right to be
present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceeding, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files
and records, and, although juvenile proceedings are not intended
to be of an adversary nature, the right to be represented by counsel. The right to be heard is extended to all current and previously appointed foster parents or representatives of an agency
interested in the minor, even though such persons do not thereby
become parties to the proceeding. In addition, any current foster
parent is entitled to and must be given adequate notice at all
stages of any proceeding wherein the custody or the status of
the minor is at issue. 60 Although exceptions to the exercise of
such rights have also been defined in this section, constitutional
guarantees of procedural due process undoutedly lengthen the
duration of juvenile court proceedings and have the potential to
disrupt a minor ward's life.
The problems created by section 701-20 are not without
difficulty, for if juvenile court proceedings may be viewed as the
beginning of a process of analysis and correction regarding the
neglected or dependent child's domestic milieu, then the propensity of constitutionally safeguarded rights to effect such
results is self-defeating. Is it possible to reconcile the goals of
the Juvenile Court Act with the procedural rights of third
parties?
In the recent case of O'Conner v. Donaldson,"' a former

patient of a state mental hospital brought an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, in United States District Court, alleging that the
hospital superintendent and other members of the hospital staff
had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. The facts of the case reveal that Donaldson's commitment was initiated by his father; that after hearings
a potentially incriminating question. However, it has been suggested
that where a separate proceeding is pending against the parents in criminal court, the objection to a section 60 examination might be sustained.
59. 49 Ill. App. 2d at 442, 200 N.E.2d at 40.
60. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9.4 (1973), which represents
the codification of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See also Comment, New Adoption Proceedings in Illinois, 7 J. MAR. J. 194 (1973).
61. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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he was found to be suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia";
and that he was committed for "care, maintenance, and treatment" pursuant to Florida statute. 2 Although the hospital
staff had the power to release a patient, the superintendent
refused to allow the power to be exercised in Donaldson's caseA5
Moreover, the evidence showed that plaintiff's confinement was
a simple regime of enforced custody rather than a program
designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness. The trial judge
instructed the jury that they should find that O'Conner had
violated Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty if he had been
confined against his will and that he was not dangerous.6 4 The
jury returned a verdict and damages for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals "affirmed in a broad opinion dealing
with the far-reaching question whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarily
civilly committed to state mental hospitals." 65 It held that
where the rationale for confinement is that the patient is in need
of treatment, the Constitution requires that minimally adequate
treatment in fact be provided. 66
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Supreme Court, concluded
that
the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by the Court
of Appeals are not presented by this case in its present posture. .

.

. As we view it, this case raises a single, relatively

concerning every
simple, but nonetheless important 6question
7
man's constitutional right to liberty.
Having deftly managed to avoid a head-on collision with the
issues raised in the appellate court's opinion, he proceeded to ask
whether the State may confine the mentally ill merely to ensure
62. The statutory provisions have since been repealed. See 422 U.S.
at 566, n. 2.
63. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Donaldson was a non-

dangerous patient, and that many respectable persons were willing to

vouch for his conduct when, and if, he was released.

64. Noting that in his instructions the trial judge had used the phrase
"dangerous to himself," Justice Stewart attempted to explain the word's
meaning by defining the condition as being present whenever the committed patient is "helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through
his own efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends."
422 U.S. at 574, n. 9.
65. 493 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 521. The district court defined a minimum level of "treatment" as being such "as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured
or to improve his mental condition."
67. 422 U.S. at 573. O'Connor argued that the adequacy of treatment
isa "nonjusticiable" question that must be left to the discretion of the
psychiatric profession, but the Court rejected that contention:
That argument is unpersuasive. Where 'treatment' is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, is it plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine
whether the asserted ground is present.
Id. at 574, n. 10.
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them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private
community, then answered by stating:
That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere
presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from
preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. 8
Although the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated and
the case remanded for a determination of whether O'Conner was
immune from liability, the Supreme Court's decision appeared
to be motivated by other factors:
Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court
of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect,
leaving this Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of
the case.6 9
Consequently, while the Supreme Court's affirmation of the
mental incompetent's right to receive treatment must await future decisions, its eventual recognition seems likely at present.
As a result, Donaldson's discussion of the rights of nondangerous mentally incompetent persons suggests a basis for
striking a balance between the goals of the Juvenile Court Act
in neglect and dependent cases and the pernicious side-effects of
the exercise of procedural rights by third parties. For not only
have mental incompetents and infants historically been accorded
roughly equivalent legal status, but in a modern context, the
relative legal positions occupied by mentally incompetent persons
who have undergone commitment and minors who become
embroiled in the juvenile court process, also permit an analogy
that envisions the extension of Donaldson rights into other areas
encompassed by the parens patriae concept. 70 Moreover, it is
undoubtedly clear that courts possess the power to declare
68, Id. at 575.
69. Id. at 578, n. 12 (emphasis added).
70. Note especially the Court of Appeals's statement that,
[W]here, as in Donaldson's case, the rationale for confinement is the
'parens patriae'
rationale that the patient is in need of treatment,
the due process clause requires that minimally adequate treatment
be in fact provided . . . . 'To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane
theraneutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.'
493 F.2d at 521 (5th Cir. 1974). Chief Justice Burger, however, took issue
with the Court of Appeals's failure to explain its basis for determining
that the rationale for Donaldson's confinement was that he needed treatment, and concluded that its premise must have been that the State has
no power to confine the non-dangerous mentally ill without providing
them with treatment. After reviewing the power traditionally exercised
by the States in this area, he summarized:
In short, the idea that States may not confine the mentally ill
except for the purpose of providing them with treatment is of very
recent origin, and there is no historical basis for imposing such a
limitation on state power.
O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 582 (1975) (separate opinion) (footnote omitted).
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as the power to
answers to Donaldson type questions, as well
71
apply the underlying principles in new areas.
Nevertheless, the various legislatures also possess the power
to make these decisions, and in the area of juvenile law, especially
as regards cases involving neglected and dependent children, they
appear best suited to undertake the task of doing so. In connection with the Illinois statute, the legislature should bear in mind
that neglected and dependent children rarely present a physical
danger to themselves or to others, that the statutory preference
for not removing a minor from his surroundings suggests a course
of treatment rather than one of incarceration, and that, in a very
real sense, the uncertainty thrust upon the child by the institution of juvenile court proceedings can have an adverse psychological effect on him that closely resembles the retarding effect
of incarceration upon non-dangerous mentally incompetent persons. At the same time, it must recognize that the exercise by
adults of their procedural rights may work to delay the onset
of treatment and thereby militate against its effectiveness.
However, under any set of circumstances the questions here
involved are of an extremely delicate nature, for the legislature
must not only decide whether a minor's right to treatment exists,
but it must also decide the extent to which this right protects
the minor from the effects of the constitutional rights of other
persons. Furthermore, the very novelty of a right to treatment
warrants that the decision-making process must proceed slowly
and carefully, so that the legislature, in its enthusiasm to
improve the quality of juvenile justice, does not unduly restrict
more established constitutional rights.
STANDARDS OF PROOF

In light of the likelihood that any meaningful reform of
the Juvenile Court Act can emerge only after a time consuming
process of legislative decision-making, an interim method of
implementing the suggestions of child care experts might be
achieved by manipulating its standards of proof. Sections
704-6 and 705-1 of the Act regulate the scope and presentation
of evidence at the adjudicatory and dispositional stages, respec72
tively, in neglect and dependent cases.
71. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion critically questioned the
propriety of judicial review in areas traditionally operated by the various
state legislatures. However, he did concede that questions regarding the
adequacy of procedure and the power of a State to continue particular
confinements are ultimately for the courts, but added that he was "not
persuaded that we should abandon the traditional limitations on the
scope of judicial review." 422 U.S. at 587.
72. Section 704-6 provides in part that "[a]t the adjudicatory hearing,

the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is a
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The adjudicatory hearing provided for in section 704-6 is
designed to determine the minor's status as a delinquent, neglected, and dependent child, or as a minor in need of supervision,
and utilizes the standard of proof and rules of evidence applicable
to any civil proceeding. Thus, questions of status will be decided
by a preponderance of the evidence.
At the disposi-tional hearing all evidence which is helpful in
determining the best interests of the child and the public will
be heard and considered, "even though [it is] not competent for
the purposes of the adjudicatory hearing. '7 3 In addition, responsible parties have a limited right to controvert social service
agency reports, and they may request that the proceedings be
adjourned for a reasonable length of time to gather additional
evidence. When presented with the latter type of motion, the
court must make temporary arrangements for the custody of the
child.
Due to the complex nature of the matters decided at the
dispositional stage, the greatest danger of judicial error is likely
to arise at this point in the proceedings. Recognizing this, and
also that the scope ,of the disposition process encompasses "[a] 11
evidence helpful in determining [the "best interests" of the minor and the public] . . . to the extent of its probative value. .. ,,7
the courts have demanded that the State prove its case by more
than a mere preponderance of the evidence. Case illustrations
may be helpful in attempting to visualize the effect of this
limitation.
In re Gibson75 concerned an appeal from a decree terminating the parental rights of Virginia Gibson, mother of two and
one-half year old Rose Gibson. Following her appointment as
guardian for the child, Patricia Gould, a psychologist and the
director of the Floberg Center where Rose had been placed, filed
a supplemental petition seeking to terminate the parent's rights
and to obtain a power to consent to the adoption of the child on
the basis of inadequate visitation by the mother. Gould testified
that the mother's visits had been infrequent up to the time of
the supplemental petition, but that thereafter their frequency
had increased dramatically. The mother stated that at first she
had visited Rose "all the time," 76 but that due to transportation
[delinquent, dependent or neglected child, or a minor in need of super-

vision]."

ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 37, § 704-6 (1973).

Section 705-1 provides that "[a]ll evidence helpful in determining
[the minor's 'best interests'] may be admitted and may be relied upon to
the extent of its probative value .
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1(1)
(1973).
73. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1(1) (1973).
74. Id.
75. 24 Ill. App. 3d 981, 322 N.E.2d 223 (1975).

76. Id. at 983, 322 N.E.2d at 224.
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problems, she later had to reduce the frequency of her visits.
On the whole the evidence was conflicting. The trial court
granted the petition, the mother appealed, and on appeal the
decree was reversed. The appellate court noted that "[a] finding
that a parent is an 'unfit person' requires more than a preponderance of the evidence," and concluded: "We are of the opinion,
therefore, that clear and convincing evidence must be shown in
the present case before finding the respondent mother an unfit
77
person."
The history of this case reveals that at the adjudicatory stage
the State was able to establish the child's dependent status by
a preponderance of the evidence; that a period of court appointed
guardianship thereafter commenced and ran uninterrupted until
the reversal of the trial court's dispositional order for lack of
clear and convincing evidence; and that following the reversal,
mother and daughter were reunited. Without passing either
on the court's finding of the mother's fitness or on the substantive validity of the petition, the instant case paints the ironic
portrait of a child who is separated from her family and thrust
into an unfamiliar environment for possibly an intolerable length
of time as a means of protecting her "best interests," only to
be returned because the State could not establish any danger
to her health or well-being.
Moreover, the potential for this type of result is not limited
to cases involving termination of parental rights and responsibilities. For example, In re Nyce18 concerned an appeal from a
dispositional order of the circuit court placing a "neglected"
minor under the guardianship of the Department of Children and
Family Services. The mother of the child alleged, inter alia, that
the facts set forth in the petition had not been established by
a preponderance of the evidence, and that the court relied on inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence in adjudicating the child
a "neglected" minor. The mother was herself a ward of the court
at the time she gave birth to her daughter. Family Services
apparently felt compelled to intervene in the child-parent relationship as quickly as possible, because seven days after the
child was born, while the mother was still recuperating from
delivery, they took custody of the infant. A neglect petition was
filed, and at a detention hearing held the following day, the
mother learned for the first time that her daughter had been
removed from the hospital. At the adjudicatory hearing the
State called the mother as a witness. 79 She testified that she
77. Id. at 984, 322 N.E.2d at 225.
78. 131 Ill. App. 2d 481, 268 N.E.2d 233 (1971).

79. The most important evidence in a case may well be the testimony
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was seventeen years old and unmarried, but that the people with
whom she was living had offered to adopt both herself and her
baby. Kenneth Hallum, a social worker with Family Services,
testified that he had seen the mother on about fifteen occasions,
but that their meetings never lasted the usual time because the
girl would become enraged, say foul things to him, and leave.
In his view she was unfit to be the mother of the child. Similarly, Agnes Piszcyek, liaison officer for Family Services and
of the parents, guardian or legal custodian of the minor. Section 60 of
the Civil Practice Act provides in part:
Upon the trial of any case any party thereto . . . may be called and
examined as if under cross-examination at the instance of any adverse party. The party calling for the examination ... may rebut the
testimony thus given by countertestimony and may impeach the witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (1973) (emphasis added). However, other
important types of evidence at the adjudicatory stage may be included:
(1) Hospital/Medical Records. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
(2) Expert Testimony. In a case where the referral to a psychiatrist
is ordered by a court, a copy of the report will be furnished to both
attorneys. If the attorneys agree, the report may be seen and considered
by the judge at the adjudicatory stage. If either attorney objects to the
admission of the report, the attorney who wishes to rely on it may subpoena the psychiatrist. A difficult question may arise when the parent's
attorney advises the court that the parents will not appear for an examination by the court psychiatrist but wish to produce their own psychiatrist to testify that such evidence is not appropriate to the case. In
such a situation the court could properly consider the refusal as evidence
against the parents. At the dispositional stage, however, these problems
are likely to be mitigated by the broad scope of section 705-1 of the Act.
Cf. Sup. Ct. Rule 215, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 A, § 215 (1973); Rule 702,
FED. R. Ev.
(3) Reputation Evidence. See, e.g., People ecx rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 42 Ill. 2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417 (1969). In this category of evidence
the State is likely to produce as witnesses school teachers, welfare case
workers, social workers, etc.
(4) Probation Officer's Report. When a minor is detained prior to
an adjudicatory hearing, a probation officer will be appointed. His duties will include making a full investigation of the family situation, including interviews with the parents. He may recommend dismissal of
the petition. On the other hand, he may recommend to the state's attorney that findings be sought and a guardian appointed. But query: can
the parent's attorney seek to bar the receipt of this report on the basis
of attorney-client privilege? The late Judge Alfred Cillela deplored the
invasion of privacy inherent in the making of the social investigation
prior to a determination of wardship, especially since a petition concerning a child might later be dismissed. Nonetheless, it is reversible error
for a court to avail itself of confidential reports from a probation officer
and not make such reports a part of the record or permit cross-examination of the piubation officers. See In re Rosmis, 26 Ill. App. 2d 226, 167
N.E.2d 826 (1960).
In People ex rel. Ryan v. Sempek, 12 Ill. 2d 581, 147 N.E.2d 295
(1958), the appellant argued that the power to investigate facts and supply evidence is an executive function which cannot be conferred upon
the court or its probation officer. However, the court refused to consider
the question since the ultimate facts had been admitted by appellant's
motion to dismiss. Cf. Witter v. Cook County Commr's, 256 Ill. 616, 100
N.E. 148 (1912).
(5) Caseworker's Investigative Report. The important feature of an
investigative report is that it may be given the greatest weight by the
court. See, e.g., People v. Hoerner, 6 Ill. App. 3d 994, 287 N.E.2d 510
(1972). Because this type of report is usually conclusory, speculative,

1976]

Illinois Juvenile Court Act

the Juvenile Court, stated that the girl was highly emotional and
unstable. The Director of the Chicago Foundlings Home testified that once or twice the girl had become angry and had
started to scream, but that such conduct was not unusual for
girls at the Home.
Against the measuring rod -of section 702-4, the appellate
court held that the evidence did not show by a preponderance
that the baby was a "neglected" minor:80
or based on hearsay, it may not be admissible at the adjudicatory stage.
On the other hand, it may be considered a public record and therefore
outside the hearsay rule. Cf. Rule 901 (b) (7), FwD. R. Ev.
80. Before a court acting pursuant to the Act can exercise its broad
equitable powers to create a dispositive scheme in the "best interests"
of the child, it must declare the child a delinquent, dependent or neglected minor, or a minor in need of supervision. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
37, § 702-1 (1973).
Section 702-4 of the Act defines a neglected minor while section 702-5
defines a dependent minor. At the present time in Cook County neglect
petitions greatly outnumber dependency petitions as indicated below:
NEGLECT PETITIONS
DEPENDENT PETITIONS
651
4095
1965
1403
3264
1966
1207
3038
1967
1795
1170
1968
2974
221
1969
3008
287
1970
2651
603
1971
2284
216
1972
2513
139
1973
3064
116
1974
Statistics procured from Cook County Juvenile Court: 1100 South Hamilton; Chicago, Illinois 60612.
The reasons for this are not clear. It is conceivable that the growing
attention paid by the media to child abuse cases has made the filing of
neglect petitions fashionable.
However, the distinction is not that significant. In many cases courts
have willingly heard dependency petitions based on facts more closely
akin to statutory neglect, and vice-versa. See, e.g., People v. Shine, 271
Ill. App. 479 (1933) (neglect petition brought on the basis of lack of
parental care and support). Cf. People ex rel. Ryan v. Sempek, 12 Ill.
2d 581, 147 N.E.2d 295 (1958). The important factor is that where a petition on its face alleges facts which raise serious questions of parental
misconduct and irresponsibility, the State, under the doctrine of parens
patriae, will intervene to determine whether the best interests of the
child are being served.
After a hearing on the question of neglect or dependence, the court
must make specific findings as to whether or not the minor is a person
named in section 702-1 of the Act. If the court retains jurisdiction, it
must additionally decree that the minor is a ward of the court. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-8 (1973). A finding of "wardship" renders the
child subject to the dispositional powers of the court.
Only after determining that the minor should be a ward of the court
can the court turn to a consideration of a dispositional scheme best suited
to his needs. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1 (1973). In In re Garmon,
4 Ill. App. 3d 391, 280 N.E.2d 19 (1972), the court, briefly describing the
alternatives in a neglect case, noted:
In the case of a neglected child, the alternatives range from continuing the child in the custody of the parents under Section 5-2(c) . . .
to the placing of the child with the Children and Family Services
with the power to consent to adoption under Sections 5-7 and 5-9.
Id. at 394, 280 N.E.2d at 21.
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At best, the testimony presented by the State established that
two social workers with limited contact with the mother of a
minor did not believe her to be a fit and proper person to raise
the child ....
We cannot conceive of how the allegations of the petition
could have been established in a case . . . where it is clear81from
the record that the parent never had custody of the child.
Therefore, although termination proceedings may involve
more drama than those involving the appointment of a guardian,
it does not follow that the potential for deleterious psychological
effects upon the child are any less significant in such cases.
Rather, as demonstrated in In re Nyce, the danger proceeds from
a statutory scheme which permits the requisite jurisdictional
facts to be established too easily, and which has the effect of
postponing review of dispositional orders until the damage has
occurred.
In addition, because the Act utilizes shifting standards of
proof, the court may not consider facts bearing upon the probable disposition of the case at the adjudicatory stage, and it may
be reversible error to do so. In fact, sections 704-6 and 705-1
have been viewed as requiring that adjudicatory and dispositional hearings be kept separate and distinct from one another.
Thus, in People v. Brady 2 the testimony and written
reports of social workers of the Department of Children and
Family Services tended to establish the unfitness of the parents,
but because the trial judge had decided both the minor's status
and the disposition of his case at a single hearing, it could not
be viewed as a strictly dispositional one. Consequently, because
the trial judge had improperly considered certain reports conthe adjudicatory stage, the appeltaining hearsay information at
83
late court reversed his orders.
81. 131 Ill. App. 2d at 486-87, 268 N.E.2d at 237.

82. 7 Ill. App. 3d 404, 287 N.E.2d 537 (1972).
83. Thus, in order to avoid the exclusion of investigatory reports or
other evidence of a "dispositional" type, as well as a possible reversal
of the court order on the ground that it is against the manifest weight
of the evidence, it seems apparent that the adjudicatory hearing must
somehow be held separately from the hearing involving the creation of
a dispositional scheme, or at least be separately labelled for the record.
However, it is less clear whether notice of subsequent judicial determinations is due the parent, guardian or custodian, after an adjudication and
finding of the requisite jurisdictional facts. As the Illinois Supreme
Court noted in People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 112
N.E.2d 697 (1953):
Upon a finding that the child is dependent, neglected, or delinquent
and the appointment of a guardian over the person of the child, the
guardianship under the act continues until the court otherwise diThe statute, however, makes no provision with respect
rects ....
to further notice to the parents during the continuing jurisdiction of
the court over the child.
Id. at 146, 112 N.E.2d at 702-03 (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION

It may be seen that the evidence provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act inhibit the application of the juvenile laws to the "best
interests" of the child, not only by employing shifting standards
of proof in neglect and dependent cases, but also by rejecting
facts which do not fall within the purview of these standards.
One remedy might be to require clear and convincing evidence
of the minor's status at the adjudicatory stage, where only a preponderance of the evidence is now required. This would have
the effect of forcing the State to prove, at the earliest possible
time, not only that the child was a neglected or dependent minor,
but also that the parents were unlikely to develop the qualities
necessary to reassume full responsibility for the child's care. If
the State were unable to demonstrate the likelihood of the
parent's unfitness, the court might permit the child to remain
with his parents, issuing such protective orders as it deemed
necessary to ensure the minor's well-being. On the other hand,
if unfitness were revealed at this earlier stage, a permanent
termination of the child-parent relationship could be anticipated,
and a dispositional scheme developed. More importantly, the
suggested alteration of the present standards of proof would help
eliminate unnecessary disruptions of the child's relationships
with adults, while ensuring that the length of proceedings would
not shatter the minor's ability to tolerate uncertainty in his life.
In this way, these two recognized principles of child care and
development would begin to operate on our present juvenile laws
pending the legislature's reconsideration of the parens patriae
concept and the role of the child's "best interests" in neglect and
dependent cases. The steadily increasing number of cases finding
their way into our juvenile courts demand that the search for
remedial solutions be commenced without further delay.
Gary Ravitz

